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Abstract 
Contemporary economic and ecological politics frequently revolves around 
a fundamental problem, of what has been left to us by previous generations, 
and what we will leave to our successors. This has grave collective, indeed 
planetary, dimensions where climate change is concerned. However, as 
economic outcomes are increasingly determined by the power of assets and 
rents, so capitalist societies are witnessing a revival of dynastic forms of 
intergenerational advantage and disadvantage, where families and 
defensive legal instruments (such as trusts) sustain wealth privately. The 
rising influence of inherited wealth since the 1970s means that liberal ideals 
of 'meritocracy' and rewards for effort and innovation become harder to 
credit. The paper considers these themes via two literatures. Firstly, by 
reflecting on the question of a sustained or 'immortal' common world, as 
explored in the work of theorists such as Honig and Arendt. Secondly, by 
looking at development of private wealth and its transmission beyond the 
lifespan, as explored by Piketty and others. By reading these literatures 
together, we confront a core existential problem of contemporary 
capitalism: the extent to which the need to sustain the common world has 
become channeled into an instinct to sustain private property.  
Introduction 
Human beings are increasingly divided by an existential accident that befalls 
them: the year of their birth. This is witnessed in two domains that are often 
discussed separately, but experienced as a whole. Firstly, there is the 
escalating climate breakdown, which looks set to wreak rising social, 
political and economic havoc across the planet over the course of the 
twenty-first century. For obvious reasons, this will impact more heavily on 
people the later they are born, posing ethical and political questions about 
what the living owe to future generations. A whole field of philosophy 
focused on questions of ‘intergenerational justice’ has emerged since the 
1970s, coinciding with rising awareness of climate change (Forrester, 2016; 
Meyer & Zalta, 2016). Movements such as ‘school strikes for climate’ 
represent a mobilisation around distinctive generational interests. New 
policy institutions, such as the Future Generations Commissioner for Wales, 
seek also to factor in the interests of those not yet born. 
Secondly, there is the rising power of assets and rents in advanced capitalist 
economies, which bestow economic privileges on those who had the fortune 
to acquire assets (such as real estate) many years in the past (Piketty, 2014). 
In heavily financialised economies such as those of Britain, the United States 
or Australia, asset ownership has become the basis of new forms of class 
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divide (Feher, 2018; Adkins et al, 2019). This maps heavily onto generational 
divides, exacerbated by the fact that the ‘baby-boomers’ also received free 
or very cheap social goods, such as university tuition and housing, then 
further by the fact that ‘millennials’ bore the brunt of the post-2008 wage 
stagnation and austerity (Milburn, 2019). With assets being passed down as 
inheritance, economic inequality can be directly transmitted from one 
generation to another, and the influence of rents rises further. The liberal 
ideal of ‘social mobility’ (which assumes that individual outcomes will 
reflect inequalities in effort and talent) is overwhelmed by the weight of past 
accumulation of wealth.  
If we take a more geo-historical perspective, we can also see the present as 
a single moment in a temporal unfolding that lasts hundreds or thousands 
of years. Theorists of the Anthropocene and the ‘capitalocene’ highlight 
critical turning points in geo-historical time, whose consequences we now 
witness and inhabit in the breakdown of eco-systems. These include the 
colonisation of the New World at the end of the 16th century (Moore, 2017), 
the deployment of fossil fuels in the industrial revolution at the end of the 
18th century (Malm, 2016), and the ‘great acceleration’ of the global 
economy that followed 1945 (Bonneuil & Fressoz, 2016). The destructive 
consequences of these moments of ‘progress’, which mostly occurred before 
any of us was born, will last far into the geo-historical future, beyond the 
lifespan of anyone currently alive. The sense that many forms of irreversible 
ecological harm were enacted or ‘baked in’ prior to our own births casts a 
different perspective on the accident of when one happens to be alive, but 
also creates new forms of debt between distant past, present and long-term 
future. Industrial modernity and the prosperity it has created over the past 
two centuries are in turn an exploitation of carbon deposits that were laid 
down millions of years in the past. As Malm argues, “wherever we look at our 
changing climate, we find ourselves in the grip of the flow of time… Ours is, 
if anything, an epoch of diachronicity” (Malm, 2016: 7-8).  
Even this very long-range geo-historical perspective is not isolated from 
contemporary intergenerational politics. The good ‘luck’ of the baby-
boomers also included the opportunities and prosperity afforded by the 
Keynesian ‘great acceleration’, in which growth of ‘the economy’ became a 
goal of governments for the first time, aided by the turn from coal to oil 
(Mitchell, 1998, 2009, 2013). This was the age of international jet travel, 
resource-intensive suburbanisation and mass consumerism. More than half 
of all CO2 emissions since the dawn of the industrial revolution have 
occurred since 1990, during a time when the scientific evidence for 
anthropogenic climate change was well-known to governments (Institute 
for European Environmental Policy, 2020). Meanwhile, the value of many 
financial assets today (including those held by pension funds) is dependent 
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on the indefinite continuation of resource extraction, producing long-term 
threats to life that financial analysts are ill-equipped to calculate 
(Christophers, 2019; Taylor, forthcoming). Industrial and financial 
modernity has brought geo-historical time into a new proximity to 
generational time.  
Ever since the 18th century, liberal capitalist societies have wrestled with the 
question of how far private ownership, firms and families should be 
permitted to extend their reach beyond a human lifespan (Beckert, 2018; 
Halliday, 2018). The desired balance, from a liberal perspective, is to sustain 
the conditions of ‘meritocracy’ and ‘competition’, while also respecting the 
rights of private individuals, families and enterprise, including rights to 
bequeath privately. But the contemporary ecological context adds a whole 
new dimension to this, seeing as the negative externalities to private 
ownership and enrichment are potentially so devastating, so far-reaching in 
time and space, that they are hard to ‘balance’ against the norm of property 
rights. At the same time, the rise of conservative and neoliberal ideas and 
policies since the 1960s has seen an expansion of private property rights, 
including (especially in the United States) an extension of property rights 
into the distant future, across generations, together with successful 
campaigns against inheritance tax (Friedman, 2009; Cooper, 2017). The 
timing of this neoliberal ascendency is either deeply unfortunate, or 
evidence of the super-rich seeking to insulate themselves from the social 
and ecological catastrophes to come (Frase, 2016; Harrington, 2016; 
O’Connell, 2020). The acclaimed HBO show Succession, first aired in 2018, 
represents the psychological and ethical dramas involved in one man’s 
efforts to pass a multi-billion-dollar business empire down via his family, 
without relinquishing control. The resonance of this show speaks of a wider 
anxiety regarding a model of capitalism that debars collective or personal 
escape from the past, thus creating a sense of fatalism with regard to the 
future.  
In this paper, I intend to explore this cluster of over-lapping 
intergenerational and diachronic concerns by considering the question of 
succession as an existential challenge, that ultimately resolves into a primal 
question: what do I hope or expect to be sustained, after my own death? 
What would I like to leave—or be left—behind? Or to put it in more economic 
terms, what value do we place in the resources and goods that outlast us, 
and how? I consider two ways in which this question is confronted. The first 
might broadly be conceived as a matter of political and moral philosophy, 
which addresses the value of a sustained and sustainable world as such. 
Seeing as this concerns the question of the afterlife, this frequently crosses 
over into theology. But even from a secular perspective, it is possible to 
identify reasons why we have commitments to an enduring world (Scheffler, 
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2013). These reasons will typically point towards political actions and work 
that seeks to leave a common legacy of some kind. 
The second way in which the question is confronted is in more narrowly 
economic terms. Institutions such as property rights, inheritance, capital, 
endowments, corporations and trusts are all instruments which allow 
economic value to be preserved, exploited and protected over time—
potentially over very long periods of time. Depending on legal frameworks, 
it may be possible for a property right or asset to have its ownership, 
beneficiaries and use to be restricted for decades or even centuries into the 
future, well beyond the lifespan of the original owner. Capital itself, Marx 
famously observed, is a case of labour power extending beyond human death 
to dominate the living, like a ‘vampire’ (Marx, 2004). Then there is the 
materiality of economic goods, which determines their capacity to hold 
value over very long timespans, and also their capacity to escape political 
interference.   
In what follows, I explore each of these concerns in turn, with a view to 
highlighting the overlaps and conflicts between the two. If we assume that 
human beings have some kind of orientation towards their own death, and 
therefore to the question of what and who succeeds them, we can see an 
immediate tension between a mentality which seeks to preserve a common 
world, and one which seeks to preserve private assets and private wealth. 
Instruments such as inheritance tax seek to establish trade-offs between 
them. But in the context of looming ecological catastrophe, there is the 
danger that—as the common world also appears more endangered and 
mortal—individuals turn increasingly or exclusively towards the affordances 
of private wealth and material objects as a source of existential security. The 
private good comes to appear more enduring than the public. And yet, that 
generalised turn towards private wealth and assets as a link to the afterlife 
makes the rescue of the common even harder to confront. A vicious circle 
ensues. The urgent normative and political question is therefore how to 
identify the points at which the question of succession becomes privatised, 
such that this might possibly be reversed. 
Sustaining a shared world 
According to many theorists of liberal modernity, modern societies seek to 
push death and dying out of sight wherever possible. The rise of medical 
expertise and ‘biopolitics’ from the late 17th century onwards meant that 
governments became increasingly preoccupied with the expert saving and 
extending of lives, and less with the sovereign decision to terminate lives 
(Foucault, 2007). Death was one of the first objects of statistical analysis, 
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and therefore one of the first phenomena to be integrated into techniques 
of collective risk calculation and insurance. Life insurance became a way of 
responding rationally and economically to death, without having to face it 
directly (Zelizer, 1978). The liberal vision of health and public health was 
one in which disease and illness were collectively and rationally eliminated 
from society, but this also meant that the spaces in which death was 
represented, located and discussed were also marginalised and hidden 
(Illich, 1995). The modern fixation upon the production and sustenance of 
human life above everything else meant, according to some sociologists, 
that death became a taboo (Walter, 1991; Aries, 1994). As Bauman argues, 
the modern would rather fight an endless series of battles for health and 
hygiene, than confront the finality of life (Bauman, 2013).  
A small minority of heroic individuals might achieve immortality via their 
deeds, but death becomes meaningless for the vast majority of modern 
subjects, and is therefore best avoided, delayed and ignored at all costs. A 
scientific view of ‘society’, made up of millions of biological beings, is one 
in which nothing is publicly valued other than security, consumption and 
life (Arendt, 1958). Foucault notes that a new emphasis on collective 
growth—of labour and life—is born around the time of Ricardo in the early 
19th century (Foucault, 2005). The birth of the Keynesian welfare state after 
1945 elevated this liberal project to new heights, mobilising the state behind 
the creation and sustenance of vitality, natality and the macro-economy 
(Cooper, 2008, 2019). From the perspective of the liberal state, economics, 
statistics and ‘the economy’ provide the enduring framework within which 
individual lives and deaths attain some meaning (forming demographic and 
macroeconomic patterns). But this empirical view of demographic 
aggregates does not offer meaning for those confronting finitude and loss. 
We can reduce the deaths of others to empirical facts, but not our own 
(Bauman, 2013) 
Health, hygiene and insurance might all therefore be viewed as mechanisms 
for what Becker diagnosed as the “denial of death” (Becker, 2014). By the 
same token, they occasion a question of what to make of one’s existence, 
seeing as its meaning can’t be found simply through obeying the ritualised 
cycle of the life-course that provides meaning in traditional societies 
(Bauman, 2013). The contingency and open-endedness of life arises in a 
society that lacks predictable, public and meaningful death rituals, and 
death instead becomes a deeply personal and private problem. This may 
provoke existentialist responses, which strive to take ethical responsibility 
for one’s radically contingent being, or—for example—nationalist 
responses, which seek a timeless ‘people’ with which to identify and derive 
meaning from. Artistic creation is the prime modern path to immortality, 
for the rarefied few who are remembered for their cultural production. 
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Sociologists have noted that, since the 1960s, modern death has become 
more visible all over again, as new techniques of therapy, commemoration, 
palliative care and record-making provide the means to speak of death, 
including one’s own, and achieve a type of immortality (Walter, 2002; 
Árnason & Hafsteinsson, 2003; Bauman, 2013).  
These sociological debates highlight the shortcomings of classical 
modernity, when it comes to narrating and justifying death. But it remains 
philosophically and existentially clear that the meaning and value of life is 
necessarily established against a backdrop of death, and therefore the 
prospect of a future world from which one is absent. There is a paradox in 
that the vital, worldly things that we value derive their meaning from 
institutions, norms and ideals that outlive us. We spend a great deal of our 
finite existence, engaging in activities that we believe will be valuable and 
valued after we have ceased to exist. The quest for immortality via one’s 
deeds and work is an implicit recognition that one will not (as per the Woody 
Allen line) “achieve it through not dying”. 
The philosopher Samuel Scheffler has argued that, regardless of theological 
or other metaphysical beliefs, each of us is implicitly invested in the 
existence of an ‘afterlife’, in the sense of a world that outlasts us (Scheffler, 
2013). If, Scheffler suggests, we knew that the world was to end at the 
moment we died, or (as in the science fiction film 28 Days Later) that we were 
the final generation, we would find it immeasurably harder to find value in 
the activities that we engage in while we are alive. This is because valuing 
things is an innately diachronic disposition, in which “we project ourselves 
into the future and invest ourselves in that future. Our emotions and our 
future courses of action both hang in the balance; they both depend on the 
fate of what we value (Scheffler, 2013: 61). The fact that there will be others 
succeeding us is what makes our own experiences and values meaningful, 
directly contradicting the image of the self-interested, immanentist modern 
subject, who is consumed entirely by their own pleasure.  
One reason for this, Scheffler argues, is that we are biased towards 
conserving existing value, and have a stake in ensuring that it outlives us. 
This, in turn, means we have an innate commitment to the existence and 
welfare of future generations (Scheffler, 2018). Our relationship to future 
generations is not an ordinary moral or contractual one, of the sort that 
liberals have sought to build a social contract upon. In any case, such a 
contract does not work, where one set of parties (i.e. the living) has the 
ability to harm the other (i.e. the unborn), but not vice versa (Forrester, 
2016). Nor does it function successfully via utilitarian calculus, seeing as 
there is a potentially infinite number of people whose welfare will be 
impacted by present choices. But Scheffler argues that, due to how we value 
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what we value, we have a vested interest in safeguarding intergenerational 
succession. Just as we derive meaning from having succeeded a previous 
generation, we also rely ethically and emotionally on future generations to 
come after us. This produces a type of intergenerational reciprocity that is 
unlike a regular contract, of the sort that is usually imagined as the basis for 
intergenerational justice: we actually need someone to come after us, just as 
they need us to factor in their interests (Scheffler, 2018: 73). 
Scheffler’s ethical and existentialist perspective on the ‘afterlife’ and on 
future generations implicitly diverts our attention towards political 
questions, of what institutions will serve to defend our values beyond death. 
The public institutions that we cherish are not simply those that prevent, 
delay or reduce the risk of our deaths (such as health and safety measures), 
but those which pre-exist and post-exist our lifespan. The contingent and 
diachronic nature of a human ethical life is dependent on robust public 
institutions, which we therefore work to defend as a condition of other 
values. Bonnie Honig describes the immense importance of “public things” 
to the vitality and urgency of democracy (Honig, 2017). These might be 
infrastructure, monuments, natural environments or buildings, which 
endure and provide a type of “democratic holding environment”, which is 
strong enough to contain the disruptions, uncertainties and experiments 
that democratic activity necessarily risks (Honig, 2017: 54). The existence of 
robust ‘public things’ provides the feeling of existential security that is 
necessary, if political actors are to seize the opportunities of positive 
democratic freedom.  
Together with Winnicott, Arendt provides the main inspiration for Honig’s 
thinking on ‘public things’, and it is worth reflecting a little on her own 
distinctive perspective on the question of mortality and immortality in the 
realm of politics. In common with the theoretical and historical perspectives 
outlined above, Arendt viewed the dawn of ‘society’ in liberal modernity as 
the obliteration of meaningful action, in favour of a scientific and statistical 
logic that was only concerned with the preservation of life and the 
maximisation of production (Arendt, 1958: 46). The liberal economic 
emphasis on ‘labour’ as an object to be governed, maximised and exploited 
for collective growth (becoming explicit in classical political economy), 
represented the dominance of biological necessity over political freedom. A 
polity that is governed exclusively via statistics, economics and the 
organisation of ‘labour’ is one that is oriented exclusively to the present and 
the living, and lacks a sense of the timeless. It elevates ephemeral needs and 
desires to the governing principle of the state.  
Against modern political science, Arendt posed the possibilities of ‘action’ 
and ‘work’, both of which are oriented to immortality in some way, but 
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which also inject novelty. As she argues, “by their capacity for the immortal 
deed, by their ability to leave non-perishable traces behind, men, their 
individual mortality notwithstanding, attain an immortality of their own 
and prove themselves to be of a "divine" nature” (Arendt, 1958: 19). Political 
‘action’ occurs in front of a public, impressing itself upon the eyes of others, 
such that it can be remembered and immortalised. But (as Honig stresses) it 
also requires a polity that outlasts its individual inhabitants, potentially 
elevating their action from the ephemeral to the timeless. Immortality, in 
contrast to ‘eternity’ of theological and Platonist thinking, depends on 
institutions and other people in order to be maintained over time. It is a 
worldly achievement, that allows finite lives to be extended via politics and 
world-building. Succession becomes something that requires collective 
planning and work, together with what Scheffler refers to as the 
‘conservative disposition’ of valuing, which seeks to sustain a common 
world from one generation to the next. 
‘Work’, in contrast to mere ‘labour’, seeks as its goal something beyond the 
sustenance of human life. Its output is not valued in terms of its necessity, 
consumer satisfaction or its ‘use value’, but in terms of its permanence. 
Work, in Arendt’s sense, is how we build what Honig refers to as ‘public 
things’, which exceed our own vulnerability and finitude, helping us to 
confront our mortality against a backdrop of material objects and 
infrastructures that contain it. At least until the dawn of capitalism, ‘work’ 
was necessarily engaged in the production of public goods (such as 
artworks), seeing as it was only in the common world that permanence could 
be achieved. From the time of the ancients through to modernity, Arendt 
argues, private property belonged to the sphere of cyclical biological needs 
(the Oikos), and offered no sense of permanence as such. “Only when wealth 
became capital, whose chief function was to generate more capital, did 
private property equal or come close to the permanence inherent in the 
commonly shared world” (Arendt, 1958: 69). 
The very idea of private ‘property’ originally implies a thing that lacks the 
resilience of ‘public things’ in a common world. The etymology of ‘property’ 
reveals its connection to a specific human being: it refers to things that are 
properly mine, which are in the rightful hands of their proper owner. My 
‘property’ helps to identify me, and vice versa. In contrast to estates and 
trusts, property (literally understood) defies a logic of intergenerational 
succession. In many non-modern societies, property has been either buried 
along with its identifying owner, thereby marking their status in death and 
a metaphysical afterlife, or else destroyed altogether. A study of Pitupi 
aborigines in Australia found that a person’s truck might be burnt upon their 
death—“the opposite of commemorating the death through inheritance”—
while their most valuable possession, namely their knowledge of land, was 
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shared in common (Myers, 1988: 72). As Arendt notes, it is only with the 
shift towards capitalism, and the enclosure of land, that private ‘property’ 
starts to take on the character of something that outlives the owner (Hann, 
2007). 
Theorists such as Scheffler, Honig and Arendt present a challenge to the 
apparent biopolitical presentism of liberal modernity. The view of human 
life as just life, to be sustained through consumption, healthcare, hygiene 
and safety until it is finished, misses out key aspects of our ethical and 
political condition, which necessarily orients us towards that which outlasts 
us. It is only by knowing and trusting that something will endure, beyond our 
own finitude, that it is possible for that finitude to be seized and exploited 
in a valuable way. As Becker and Bauman both argue, all societies need ways 
of denying or defying death (as futile as these might be), but which are 
culturally and politically productive, where they seek to leave and defend a 
legacy over time. The political and ethical failure of liberal modernity has 
been to hide and silence death, so as to suppress the generative urge to 
overcome it through action, work, public things or collective succession 
planning.  
These critical perspectives are especially valuable today, seeing as they 
speak directly to the ubiquitous concern with intergenerational politics and 
succession. Against a statistical and economistic view of change as constant 
progress, which can only offer the prospect of marginally more life and 
consumption, they emphasise the apparently unmodern importance of 
durable institutions as a precondition of freedom, and of orientation to 
death (or ‘afterlife’ in Scheffler’s terms) as a condition of fulfilled and 
valuable life. In the context of escalating ecological disaster and financial 
rents, liberal modernity becomes paradoxically incapable of unleashing the 
one thing that it purports to value most: a new start, and an undetermined 
life. Modernity in the age of global warming and neoliberal financialisation 
sees a model of perpetual change (or ‘growth’) that actually delimits 
possibilities for action and renewal. By contrast, the version of conservatism 
offered by Arendt, Honig and Scheffler emphasises the need to sustain 
common institutions, within which the new can be born. Moreover, this 
sustenance is not simply an act of altruism towards the young or the unborn 
(requiring sacrifice or philanthropy of some kind), but rather a means of 
establishing the value of actions and experiences today, by anchoring them 
in rituals and things that will endure until tomorrow. The worry is (and it is 
one shared by Arendt and Honig) is that the declining trust in the resilience 
of the shared world leads people to turn increasingly to the private world—
of private property, assets, precious objects—instead, as a sphere of 
permanence. It’s to this that we now turn. 
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Privatised immortality 
The ideal of liberal modernity, as the secular and immanentist valorisation 
of life as such, finds its corollary in economic liberalism, as resistance to 
dynastic power. But as we shall see, this vision has run into repeated 
obstacles, presented by the economic power of previous generations, which 
shapes and limits the possibilities of the present. To some extent, this is an 
inevitable feature of the ‘path dependency’ of economic development, and 
the logic of capital, which sucks in reserves of value to be exploited in the 
future. Thomas Piketty’s landmark analysis, showing that returns on capital 
(‘r) have historically always outstripped growth in income (‘g’) from 
production (‘r>g’) suggests that capitalism has an inbuilt tendency towards 
the creation of a rentier class (Piketty, 2014). But it is also a matter of design: 
remnants of feudal institutions, such as trusts, grant the prospect of 
achieving immortality via wealth, that have experienced a resurgence in our 
contemporary era of financialised capitalism (Harrington, 2016). As in the 
Belle Epoque of the late 19th century, the preservation and bequeathing of 
private wealth has become an immortality strategy, that denies or defies 
death via dynastic power. In extreme cases, this is generating a “neo-
feudalism” which seeks to preserve private wealth at the expense of 
everything public (Dean, 2020). 
Since its birth in the 18th century, the ideology and project of economic 
liberalism has sought to challenge the power of the dead over the living. By 
asserting labour as the source of all value, classical political economists 
sought to promote the rights and powers of living, labouring bodies, and to 
establish the growth of population and productivity as the basis of collective 
wealth. At the same time, this was a direct confrontation with feudal and 
aristocratic norms, which sought to restrict use of property to within 
traditional family lines, regardless of productivity and use. Adam Smith, 
Thomas Paine and the French and American revolutionaries were all 
opposed to feudal traditions of entails, which removed property from 
circulation permanently on the basis of inheritance, thereby defending it 
from the state (Beckert, 2018). Restraining testamentary powers, and 
ensuring that property entered the circulation of the market (for instance 
through challenging primogeniture inheritance norms), was viewed as a 
crucial means of releasing the vitality of labour and market competition 
(Halliday, 2018).  
And so, the target of liberal economic critique was not only the mercantilist 
state (which sought to restrict free trade, so as to engage in a zero-sum 
competition for gold), but the remnants of a feudal order that elevated 
family bloodline above production, as a criterion of deserved property 
allocation. Under feudalism, immortality was a property of guilds and trusts, 
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that could preserve estates on behalf of a family from one generation to the 
next, beyond the reach of the crown (Harrington, 2016). The danger of rent-
seeking (as identified by David Ricardo) lay specifically in the nature of land, 
which risked being held back from efficient usage. Modern institutions such 
as inheritance tax and equality of inheritance (between siblings and between 
men and women) were justified by liberals and radicals on the basis that they 
avoided such inefficient concentrations of land, and helped put land into 
circulation, where it could be exploited efficiently by labour. The modern 
institution of the ‘will’ granted greater individual freedom to divide property 
up, and thereby break with patrimonial traditions of heredity. 
A balance needed to be struck between ensuring equality of opportunity and 
respecting individual property rights, including the right to bequeath 
(Beckert, 2018). But at the outset of liberalism (and for the revolutionary 
liberals of the 18th century), the prime challenge was to resist excessive 
rights of aristocratic estates, rituals and trusts. One significant early victory 
occurred with the establishment in England in 1682 of the so-called ‘Rule 
Against Perpetuities’ (RAPs), which delimited the length of time that the 
ownership and use of property could be stipulated beyond an owner’s death. 
Much earlier than this, the Statutes of Mortmain (‘dead hand’) had ruled 
against the use by noblemen of church estates to hold property in 
perpetuity, as a way of avoiding taxes. These laws were lifted wholesale into 
American law following the Revolution. Trusts and charitable trusts 
represented one of the thorniest problems for the state and for liberal 
reformers, seeing as they drew—and still draw—heavily on unwritten 
mediaeval notions of honour and fidelity, that are difficult to legislate 
against (Harrington, 2016). For this reason, they have offered a refuge for 
wealth that successfully resisted the dominance of liberalism and 
capitalism.   
The industrial revolution altered the nature of wealth, and with it, the 
nature of the problem of permanent ownership. With the rise of new 
industrial entrepreneurs, it was not just land that was passed down through 
the family, but fixed and financial capital. Marx’s critique of capital 
developed the logic of Smith et al, to argue that, if labour was the source of 
all value, then capital must be a form of ‘dead labour’ that had accumulated 
in the hands of a particular class, the bourgeoisie (Marx, 2004). The 
spectacle of labourers being exploited in factories suggested to Marx a 
different way in which the dead dominated the living (as a ‘vampire’), given 
that capital was really the produce of past work. In that sense, Marx offered 
an extension and radicalisation of the liberal critique of feudalism, only now 
pointing to the threat posed to living labour by ‘dead labour’.  
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By the late 19th century, capitalism had generated an oligarchical, rentier 
‘leisure class’ who commanded vast concentrations of wealth, achieved via 
the rights of capital ownership and accumulation (Veblen, 2001). Most 
people owned nothing throughout the 19th century, while 80-90% of wealth 
was acquired via inheritance; in France, annual flows of inheritance were 
equivalent to 25% of GDP by the end of the 19th century (Piketty, 2014). New 
professional specialisms in accounting and law emerged to help super-
wealthy families manage and transfer their assets (Harrington, 2016). The 
birth of the modern corporation in the 1870s offered a new ownership and 
governance model, based upon limited liability, that allowed capital to 
attain a level of disembodied institutional permanence that was previously 
only possessed by public institutions (Chandler, 1977). In all these ways, 
liberalism’s ambition to assert the rights of the living (labour) over the dead 
(inherited and accumulated wealth) was undone through its alliance with 
capitalism. The waning influence of feudal aristocratic property rights was 
more than compensated for by the rising power of a capitalist ownership 
class, aided by a supportive legal infrastructure .  
Capital depends on liberal rights of ownership in order to be justified and 
defended, but ownership of capital provides a very different type of political 
power than ownership of other property forms. What distinguishes capital 
is a specific orientation towards and control over time: the capitalist makes 
promises to investors about future returns and repayments, that then have 
to be honoured through the exploitation of capital and labour. To own 
capital is to own rights to future income streams, and not simply to be 
‘properly’ identified with a material object. It’s for this reason that Braudel 
distinguished the rise of capitalism from that of the market, specifically with 
the moment that capitalist enterprises and financiers were able to transcend 
and organise the chronology of social life, and to exploit this asymmetry in 
order to generate profit (Braudel, 1979). Capitalist investors and 
entrepreneurs draw profit from finding a relationship to and over the future, 
that allows them to dominate others (Knight, 1957). With the turn towards 
financialisation in the 1970s, profits become increasingly based in the 
development of calculative tools that allow their owners to manipulate time 
(Esposito, 2011; Krippner, 2012).  
As assets become increasingly intangible in nature, so they become more 
dependent on legal instruments for their existence and preservation. Where 
land or industrial capital can retain their form and use value regardless of 
legal property rights, a patent or a financial derivative only exist (and hold 
value) thanks to their legal specification and protection. As Pistor argues, 
law grants capital its code, detailing various ways in which its value can be 
shielded from the various claims that might be made upon it, be it from 
governments, creditors or other stakeholders (Pistor, 2019). Amongst the 
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key attributes of capital that are granted by law is ‘durability’, which allows 
assets to hold value in the face of uncertainty and economic crises. In 
particular, the corporate form is a unique legal instrument that produces 
personhood and immortality (Pistor, 2019). Combinations of corporate and 
trust law allow assets to be shielded, allowing beneficiaries of capital to 
escape the full costs of their actions and failures.  
Materials and technology also shape capital’s capacity to extend its 
dominium into the future in a way that transcends the lifespans of its 
initiators. As Mitchell has argued, the ability to capitalise large firms in the 
late 19th century depended partly on the legal innovation of limited liability, 
which allowed very large sums of capital to be pooled, without equivalent 
risk to the investors, but it also coincided with the invention of steel 
(Mitchell, 2019). Arendt’s idea of ‘work’ as the production of quasi-
permanent things is subsumed within the logic of capital. The resilience of 
physical materials over time (such as those which formed railways and 
skyscrapers) meant that projected future income streams also extended that 
much further in time. Similarly today, the ability to capitalise immaterial 
entities such as a loan book or a dotcom start-up is partly dependent on 
accounting innovations, but also on the advance of digital surveillance 
technologies which promise to keep track of individual behaviour into the 
future, so as to predict and guarantee an income schedule (Leyshon & Thrift, 
2007; Muniesa et al, 2017). The birth of giant platforms in the first decade 
of the twenty-first century has unleashed new ways to render the future 
visible and calculable (Srnicek, 2016).    
Piketty’s analysis suggests that a capitalist economy will have an in-built 
tendency to produce steady concentrations of wealth, which continue over 
generations, unless there is the political will to oppose this. As capital grows 
faster than income, so the power of rents (and a rentier class, living off the 
good fortune of privatised or inherited assets) rises accordingly 
(Christophers, 2020). Progressive inheritance and income taxes between 
1918 and 1980, together with the effect of world wars, was the only period 
in the history of capitalism when intergenerational wealth concentration 
was challenged and inequality reduced (Piketty, 2014). Piketty makes some 
striking observations about the relation between wealth and mortality. The 
1940s was the only time in the history of capital, that the wealth of those 
alive exceeded the wealth left at death (2014: 396). By the 1970s, net wealth 
accumulated during the lifetime of the living was the majority of all wealth 
for the first time in human history, while inheritances amounted to only 40% 
of all private capital (2014: 402). Uniquely, the generations born between 
1910-60 earned more income from work than from wealth (2014: 418). We 
might say that 1918-80 was the only period—following the revolutionary 
challenge to feudalism, then the wartime and policy challenge to capitalist 
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oligarchy—in which the promise of liberalism, to assert the authority of the 
living over the dead, was actually honoured.  
Piketty’s infamous assessment is that, since that moment in the 1970s, 
capitalist economies have been reverting to the tendencies they displayed 
during the 19th century. Once again, concentration of wealth is more a 
function of family ties, legal acumen and privatisation than of risk-taking or 
productivity (Pistor, 2019; Christophers, 2020). While capital grows at a 
steady rate, year on year, population size and incomes in the West struggle 
to keep up. With stagnating population and GDP growth in the 21st century, 
Piketty believes that developed capitalist economies will soon revert to the 
form of oligarchy seen in the United States and Europe prior to the First 
World War (2014: 378). The only means of averting this outcome, he argues, 
is a major ideological pivot away from ‘hyper-capitalism’ and towards a form 
of ‘participatory socialism’ which would restore much higher taxes on 
inheritance and wealth, and set time limits to property rights (Piketty, 
2020). This is in keeping with the long-standing liberal ambition to resist 
the over-weaning power of past accumulations of wealth. 
Piketty’s emphasis on ideology recognises that the 1970s also saw a major 
reassertion of the rights of capital, inheritance and the family, which 
dramatically altered the policy agenda to the benefit of property-holders 
and intergenerational wealth accumulation. The history of neoliberal 
attacks on taxation and organised labour has been repeatedly told (e.g. 
Harvey, 2005; Glyn, 2006). Piketty emphasises the very significant fall in top 
rates of marginal tax on inheritance and income, which had previously done 
more than anything else to curtail the power of inherited wealth from World 
War One onwards (Piketty, 2020). But the neoliberal ideological transition 
also witnessed a renewed conservative emphasis on the family as the moral 
unit through which social externalities (care, education, unemployment, 
dependencies) would be managed (Cooper, 2018). In the absence of a 
coherent idea of ‘society’, conservatives re-imagined intergenerational 
commitments purely via the private line of the family. As Cooper shows, the 
rise of finance coincided with a new moral economy of the household that 
personalised and privatised the bonds of dependency from one generation 
to the next. This included a far more favourable view of inheritance, at the 
same time as private wealth was concentrating rapidly all over again.  
In the United States, the justification for inheritance had always been far 
more based upon the testamentary freedom of the individual property-
holder (as opposed to, say, a belief in the organic value of family) (Beckert, 
2018). From the 1970s onwards, a neoliberal and conservative argument for 
the extension of property rights and the control of assets beyond death 
gained increasing momentum. In addition to campaigns against inheritance 
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tax (such as George W Bush’s 2000 policy  pledge to gradually unwind ‘death 
taxes’), a series of legislative measures over the late 20th century reversed 
various measures that had sought to prevent granting legal rights to the 
dead (Friedman, 2009; Madoff, 2010). RAPs, which had survived intact since 
early modern England, was steadily repealed in state after state, to the point 
where some states now allow for use and beneficiaries of property to be 
stipulated up to 1,000 years into the future. Ray Madoff highlights a range 
of legal areas in which “the rights of the dead have flourished while little 
attention has been paid to the costs imposed on the living” (Madoff, 2010: 
7). Besides the issues of taxation and perpetuities already noted, these 
include the extension of intellectual property rights and greater rights to 
control how one’s body is used and preserved. 
During the 1990s, as wealth became increasingly concentrated and 
increasingly financial in form, a new profession of ‘wealth managers’ was 
born, specialising in looking after the wealth of super-rich individuals and 
their families (Harrington, 2016). The techniques and objectives of wealth 
management were eerily reminiscent of feudal estates: to deploy the 
affordances of trusts and charitable trusts, so as to avoid paying tax to the 
state. In her study of the wealth management industry, Harrington notes the 
ways in which the trust model of ownership retains an important unwritten 
moral code: 
Although wealth management is now a paid profession, the essential normative 
demands of honor, selfless service, prudence, and loyalty—however often they 
may be violated in practice—remain unchanged in many respects from their 
origins in the relations among feudal nobles. The knightly ethic is still very much 
alive in contemporary wealth managers' vision of themselves and their work. 
(Harrington, 2016: 43) 
Harrington finds that, in contrast to private asset management or hedge 
fund management, wealth management is primarily defensive, with the aim 
“not to grow the fortune but to preserve it against the many hazards facing 
it” (Harrington, 2016: 137). Trusts are used because they are legally opaque, 
establishing a gentlemanly relationship of obligation between those who are 
the beneficiaries of an asset, and those trustees tasked with looking after it. 
The wealth manager invariably develops an intimate moral and emotional 
relationship with their clients, as they find themselves having to assist with 
thorny family issues relating to inheritance, the needs and habits of 
children, divorces and mistresses.  
This speaks of a whole new sphere of professional services, including ‘family 
offices’, which exists to lubricate the everyday international lives of the 
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super-rich, and prevent them being obstructed by jurisdictional barriers and 
taxation (Glucksberg & Burrows, 2016). Wealth is kept offshore as much as 
possible, so as to avoid tax and laws such as RAPs. Vast wealth offers the 
ultimate in ‘negative liberty’, to the point where norms of citizenship and 
basic regulations no longer limit freedom (Davies, 2017). Wealth managers 
and family offices specialise in offering security and secrecy for those whose 
wealth makes them paranoid about being publicly recognised or having their 
assets come under the eye of tax authorities. This is allied to a highly 
lucrative legal services industry, which serves to stitch together different 
legal instruments to defend assets from taxation or other claims upon 
wealth (Pistor, 2019). The expert defence and preservation of assets is an 
entire industry in its own right.  
The defensive mentality of the super-rich and their agents is also reflected 
in a new orientation towards material possessions, which become judged 
increasingly in terms of how effectively they can serve as a store of value 
over time. Boltanski and Esquerre have conceptualised a new “enrichment 
economy”, consisting of rare and ‘timeless’ objects, whose value is 
established through networks of expertise (which acts to verify their 
authenticity) and investors, who tacitly collaborate to defend certain classes 
of object as high-worth (Boltanski & Esquerre, 2016). These are objects with 
negligible use value, seeing as they do not exist to be consumed or depleted 
in any way. But nor can they be judged entirely in terms of exchange value, 
which would run the risk of their monetary value being revealed as a bubble. 
Instead there are signs of the super-rich turning towards objects that seem 
to transcend human history—such as the 10,000-year clock that Jeff Bezos 
has invested $42m in—as a means to achieve permanence, on the basis of 
financial wealth that is otherwise disconcertingly abstract in form.  
Even away from the outlandish world of the super-wealthy, the conservative 
turn against inheritance tax, together with the financialisation of the 
economy, has produced societies in which the ownership and inheritance of 
assets has become a decisive wedge in the distribution of life chances 
(Adkins et al, 2019). The rise in home ownership since the 1970s, then the 
steady growth of the housing market since, is one of the main causes for the 
intergenerational economic schisms of the 21st century (Christophers, 2018; 
Milburn, 2018). By 2013, private wealth in the UK was five times GDP, where 
it had been just double GDP in the 1970s (Atkinson, 2018). The wealth that 
the baby-boomer generation has accumulated, largely as a consequence of 
existential luck, is already being passed on via gifts and inheritance, but 
largely through the family, given the difficulty that boomers’ children and 
grandchildren face in acquiring assets or living in the private rental market 
off wages (Milburn, 2019). Many of the apparently intergenerational 
political schisms of our times (as revealed in voting behaviour and 
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preferences) are, on closer inspection, a reflection of asset ownership and 
non-ownership, with ownership of housing correlating closely with 
particular voting patterns (Ansell & Adler, 2019; Chrisp & Pearce, 2019). 
In these ways, wealth—and specifically capital—becomes a means of 
denying and defying death, and achieving some form of immortality. For the 
individual facing their own death, bequeathing can be an act of generosity 
and narcissism at the same time (Fenichel, 1938). It allows them to support 
those they love, while also gaining recognition for their status as 
benefactors, and to protect their reputations in death (Lamb, 2014). It is not 
only the family that provides this recognition: charitable trusts and 
philanthropy have historically been the chief means through which wealthy 
Americans seek to have their names ‘live on’, and charitable law has been 
far more forgiving of ‘perpetuities’ (such as the right to have one’s name 
associated with something indefinitely) than other areas of law (Madoff, 
2010). The return of vast financial estates in the late 20th century was 
accompanied by a new era of ‘philanthrocapitalism’, exemplified by the Bill 
& Melinda Gates Foundation (McGoey, 2012, 2015). This potentially 
channels private wealth towards the restoration of the ‘public things’ that 
Honig fears for, and yet in the fixation on calculating ‘social return on 
investment’, the new philanthrocapitalism is allergic to the support of the 
public as an intrinsic good.  
The fear is that, in the face of economic stagnation and ecological crisis, the 
instinct to deploy wealth in a conservative fashion—for the protection of 
one’s children, or a fantasy of material immortality—grows stronger. Fear of 
the future and fear of death combine to produce a set of political behaviours, 
such as Brexit and support for regressive tax policies, that make the creation 
of a viable future even harder to achieve (Solomon et al, 2015). What 
Scheffler identifies as the “conservative disposition” that drives how we 
value things (that is, the hope that they will endure) switches increasingly 
from the conservation of the common world, to the defence of property and 
existing property relations. The implication for the young and the unborn is 
that injustices have been pre-determined via ancestry, and economic 
heredity counts for everything, in precisely the way liberals once sought to 
oppose.   
Socialising the afterlife  
There is now a recognisable dystopian vision of how climate breakdown and 
‘neo-feudal’ capitalism could coincide over the rest of this century. This 
would see an on-going privatisation of risk, welfare and security, to a point 
where wealth was exclusively channelled via private means and corporations 
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to defend particular private interests, against the threat of common 
planetary devastation. A vicious circle of defensive assertion of private 
property rights and retreat from common threats would ensue. What Wendy 
Brown has termed the ‘undoing’ of ‘the Demos’ would be complete (Brown, 
2015). This scenario has been mapped in science-fictional form by Peter 
Frase, as one of the ‘four futures’ that could bring capitalism to an end, with 
the tag of “exterminism” (Frase, 2016). The corporation has long provided 
ample material for dystopian science fiction writing, seeing as it has a kind 
of ‘zombie’ form that outlives mortal humans (See Davies, 2018, esp. Horn, 
2018). Libertarian, accelerationist, cybernetic and trans-humanist fantasies 
of abandoning the existing biological eco-system, in favour of immortal 
artifices, have acquired fresh momentum in the face of climate breakdown 
and so-called ‘secular stagnation’ of capitalism (Noys, 2014; O’Connell, 
2017, 2020).  
Such fearful imaginaries of the future provoke understandably defensive 
attitudes towards family. Parents and grandparents ask themselves what 
they might be able to do or leave for their offspring, to defend them against 
the iniquities of financialised capitalism. Young people ask themselves 
whether it is right to even have children (or more than one child), in an age 
of climate breakdown (Crist, 2020). The sense of a depleted common world, 
which will become increasingly depleted as a progressively deepening 
tragedy of the commons, privatises and domesticates the sense of the 
‘afterlife’ that Scheffler writes of. A world without the ‘public things’ that 
Honig writes of would still have things in it, but they would matter to us in 
ways that were no longer common and thereby political (Honig, 2017: 30). 
The modern condition of freedom as indeterminacy, that spawns 
existentialist ethics and is at work in Arendt’s vision of ‘action’, becomes 
superseded by a stream of genetic, ecological and financial heredity, in 
which there is little freedom on the part of the living to determine what 
should succeed them and how.  
Current political orthodoxy treats the management and preservation of the 
commons as an economic problem of ‘externalities’. To view nature and 
society as ‘externalities’ means to recognise that they evade private property 
rights, but assumes that this requires either the invention of new types of 
property right (as an intellectual property right is invented to deal with the 
cultural commons), or a new type of accounting device such as ‘natural 
capital’ which is capable of monetising non-market goods. Efforts to 
accommodate social and ecological crisis into current accounting and 
management frameworks have the effect of defending the hegemony of 
existing financial and corporate power, by suggesting that existing 
categories of risk, capital and return are adequate to capture all future 
threats. This paves the way for the future scenario that Wainwright and 
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Mann refer to as ‘climate behemoth’, in which the corporation becomes the 
central political actor in the handling of climate breakdown (Wainwright & 
Mann, 2018). But qualitative research on those implementing financial and 
corporate instruments in response to global and existential threats provides 
little cause for comfort that they are able to think seriously about the future 
as an existential reality to come, and not simply as a model or brand 
produced for short-term rhetorical purposes (Wright & Nyberg, 2015; 
Christophers, 2017, 2019).   
The urgent ethical and political question is how to break free of the vicious 
circle of dynastic logic, which can only view the future as the preservation 
of a private inheritance, against a backdrop of public destruction. This is 
clearly a matter of achieving intergenerational justice, but it is important 
that this is grasped in its sociological and existential dimensions, and not 
simply seen as a normative question of who deserves what; the issue is not 
whether people care about the ‘afterlife’ or their descendants (they do), but 
to what extent this is expressed via care for durable, common, public things. 
The naivete of liberal modernity is in the expectation that death and 
mortality can be eliminated from political and economic view, by an 
emphasis on maximisation of health and productivity. This may always have 
been philosophically naïve, but it is now also historically and empirically 
naïve, given the way economic and ecological crises have turned policy 
choices into matters of life and death. If people need a meaningful 
orientation towards their own finitude, and some means of defying it, then 
the alternative to the dystopian neo-feudal climate breakdown 
(‘exterminism’) is a rediscovery of the common political world celebrated by 
Arendt and Honig, which is durable enough for the unexpected and the 
genuinely novel to arise.  
As Honig stresses, this includes the creation and defence of material 
infrastructures, that can act as a democratic ‘holding’ environment. But it 
would also include the legal infrastructures that allow for socialised 
‘perpetuities’, such as democratic ownership models, that outlive their 
founders and individual members. One of the main triggers for the creation 
of employee-owned companies is the problem of ‘business succession’, 
which arises when the owner of a private company (often the founder) nears 
retirement. Transfers within the family have a very high failure rate for 
various reasons, meaning that a gradual employee buy-out has the 
advantage of sustaining a firm, without being dependent on the enthusiasm 
and commitment of any one individual (Davies, 2009; Davies & Michie, 
2012). Many co-operatively governed firms in the UK use trusts to hold their 
shares, pointing to a different way in the ideal of ‘perpetuities’ could be re-
imagined and socialised. Rather than merely fight the financial logic, which 
compels people to abide by a road-map of their own future, the political 
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question is how the future could be invested for differently and collectively 
(Feher, 2018).   
The release of wealth from private control brings profound psychological 
challenges, seeing as firms, things and assets can be ruined or wasted by 
successors. There is a necessary risk in a gift, especially where it occurs 
following one’s own death. A gift necessarily involves loss, and the refusal 
to accept loss (of life, of control) is commensurately a refusal to make gifts. 
The repeal of RAPs by American conservatives and the rise of 
philanthrocapitalism, which uses minute forms of social accounting to 
ensure that donations establish a good ‘impact’ or ‘return’, are examples of 
what happens when the wealthy seek to keep hold of their benefactions, 
even after they’ve ostensibly relinquished them (and relinquished life).  But 
refusing to relinquish control of wealth also breeds its own psychological 
injuries, as HBO’s Succession depicts. The drug addict son in Succession, who 
will never be free of his father’s money, is a not inaccurate depiction of the 
problems that befall many children of the super-wealthy, and which wealth 
managers find themselves called to help with (Harrington, 2016). The 
alternative to a domineering patrimonial generosity is an intergenerational 
egalitarianism and mutual recognition, which respects the separateness and 
equal dignity of past, present and future.  
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